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Preface 
This volume contains the proceedings of the First International Workshop on Context 
Awareness and Trust (CAT), held on 30 July 2007 in Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada, in 
conjunction with the IFIPTM conference on Trust Management 
(http://www.unb.ca/pstnet/itrust-pst2007/).  
The CAT workshop aims to stimulate an active exchange of new ideas on the mutual 
relationship between the area of context awareness and the area of trust, privacy and 
security. The CAT workshop aims to bring experts together, to collect the state of the art, to 
identify open and emerging problems, and to propose future research directions. The 
workshop attendees will explore related work, theoretical frameworks, and applications 
which focus on the relationship between these domains. 
The CAT workshop looks at the evolution of today's infrastructures towards more pervasive 
and ubiquitous context aware infrastructures. This phenomenon raises new challenges and 
new opportunities regarding trust, security, and privacy. The focus on cross pollinating 
trust, security, and privacy with context awareness will bring new insights and food for 
thought, as well as provide an interesting playground for the IFIP Trust Management 
(IFIPTM) community. In particular:  
• 
• 
The opportunity to use context as an opportunity to enhance privacy, trust or security 
seems an interesting, innovative, and value-adding extension to IFIPTM. For example, 
the availability of context information can help the establishment of trust relationship 
(users in the same room for the same meeting are more willing to trust each other more 
than users without visible contact). Moreover, contextual information can be used to 
improve dynamic, adaptive, and autonomic aspects of security, access control, and 
privacy control/enforcement.  
The opportunity to apply the results achieved in security, privacy, and trust to 
strengthen context aware infrastructures and to facilitate the exchange of context 
information is a challenge for IFIPTM community. For example, because context 
information often has a personal character, privacy and other rights of individuals must 
be carefully protected. Moreover, trust is an essential prerequisite for secure exchange 
and usage of context information at different quality levels (i.e., Quality of Context).  
The workshop is primarily intended for researchers with a computer science background 
and researchers from other relevant disciplines such as legislation, usability design, as well 
as social and behavioral sciences. 
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Eleven papers were submitted to this workshop. Out of these, 5 papers were accepted for 
online publication at CEUR Workshop Proceedings and oral presentations. All selected 
papers are of high quality, thanks to the professionalism of the authors, reviewers, and 
program committee members. All papers were reviewed by at least three reviewers from 
the program committee. The workshop proceedings and other information can also be 
found at the workshop website: http://cat07.telin.nl. 
The papers in this volume are representative for the current research activities on the 
topics indicated in the title and sub-title of the workshop. Aspects regarding trust, privacy, 
and security and their interdependency with context information discussed not only from a 
technical perspective, but also from the user’s perspective.  
We would like to take this opportunity to thank people who contributed to the CAT07 
workshop. We wish to thank all authors and reviewers for their valuable contributions, and 
we wish them a successful continuation of their work in this area. Finally, we thank the 
organization of the IFIPTM 2007 conference in which this workshop was embedded.  
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Perceived Privacy in Ambient Intelligent Environments 
Maddy D. Janse1, Peter Vink, Iris Soute, Heleen Boland 
Philips Research, High Tech Campus 34, 5656 AE Eindhoven, The  Netherlands, 
maddy.janse@philips.com
Abstract. User studies were conducted to explore the different conditions and 
constraints that affect people’s perceived privacy in a networked home 
environment. Context-aware applications for an extended home environment 
provided the setting and conditions for inducing privacy-sensitive situations. A 
presence detection and sharing system was placed in people’s homes to conduct 
a longitudinal field test under realistic conditions. People’s preferences for 
masking and hiding information that is being shared were investigated for 
different types of applications. The results showed that people use various 
mechanisms to preserve their social privacy. They share their personal 
information only with a small group of close relatives and friends and only 
when there is a clear benefit for them. Maintaining control over the level of 
information that is being shared, is crucial. Design guidelines were derived 
from these results to address end-users requirements with regard to perceived 
privacy.  
Keywords. Ambient intelligent systems, networked home environment, 
perceived privacy, context-aware applications, user studies. 
1 Introduction 
Applications in extended networked home environments are intended to facilitate the 
communication between users of different households and to provide them with a 
feeling of a shared ambiance. Connecting people in this way influences their social 
relationships. Home, as we know it, is a place where people can retreat from society 
and its social rules. Extended home applications induce intrusions in this familiar and 
trusted environment. Since ambient intelligent systems are by definition unobtrusive 
and embedded in the user’s environment, users might easily forget their existence and 
unwillingly have their privacy violated. “Perceived privacy” or how end-users 
perceive that the system affects their privacy, is one of the key aspects for the 
acceptance of ambient intelligent systems by users. It is also one of the most complex 
problems to handle. It is about ‘how, when, and to what extent’ data about people are 
revealed to other people within a dynamic social context. 
The major challenge with regard to ensuring people’s privacy in an ambient 
intelligent environment is to account for the implications induced by acquiring, 
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collecting and inferring personal information of users. The tracking and collection of 
significant portions of users’ everyday activities and interactions are required to 
compose user profiles and to model the context in which these user behavior’s and 
interactions occur. The disclosure of this private information to other parties, whether 
it be friends or family, service providers or commercial traders, in return for benefits 
like receiving a desired personalized and context-aware service or specific activities 
being taken care of, induces a delicate balance that needs to be maintained (1) and 
protected.  
An empirical approach was taken to address this problem in which exploratory, field 
and concept studies were conducted to acquire user input for design guidelines for 
application development and for specific application implementations. The context in 
which these studies were conducted was provided by the application scenarios that 
were developed in the Amigo project (2) for the networked extended home 
environment. These studies are presented in the following sections. 
2   Privacy Handling in Everyday Communications 
An exploratory study was conducted to obtain implicit information about people’s 
attitudes towards privacy sensitive situations that might be induced by having an 
operational networked extended home environment (1). Romero (3) investigated 
which types of communication media are currently being used, the frequency in 
which they are used and the contact purpose for which they are being used. Most 
commonly used media types were mobile phone, home phone, MSN, e-mail and 
regular mail. They were used for different contact categories based on their content: 
practical, social, emotional and special occasion. These categories were used as the 
primary structure for addressing the following questions: what are the privacy needs 
for the different types of communication media and how do people currently handle 
their privacy needs? 
2.1 Methodology 
To acquire information about how people handle their privacy in everyday 
communications, an ethnographic methodology was used in which people were asked 
to keep a diary for one week to record all their home-based communications. After 
that period a semi-structured interview was conducted. The diary served to log all 
types of one week’s communications and to facilitate the interview by having explicit 
cues available. It excluded face-to-face meetings and communications outside the 
home. The interview focused on what types of information people regard as highly 
sensitive and how they make sure that their moments of communication are not 
disrupted. A storyboard for guided exploration was used to structure the interview. 
The storyboard presented different potentially privacy violating situations, for 
example, presence notification, automatic identification and automatic intervention. 
To accomplish a comprehensive coverage of everyday communication, participants 
were selected from a wide range of age and social situation. The participants (n=6) 
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were: (a) an 88 year-old grandmother with a large family of children and 
grandchildren and living with her husband; (b) two middle-aged men (39 and 41) with 
a young family; (c) a woman, aged 25, in a single household; (d) one man, aged 27, 
living with a girlfriend; (e) a teenage girl (age 15) living with her parents and a sister.  
This sample of participants covering a wide range of social conditions was used to 
explore the handling of privacy in daily communication situations in a qualitative 
way. 
2.2 Results and conclusions 
Privacy sensitive communications are usually personal and/or emotional according to 
most participants. Examples of disruptive situations for them are: someone at the 
door, someone on the other phone line, bad telephone connections and noisy children 
in the house. Escaping to the attic or keeping children busy with a movie was used as 
a strategy to maintain privacy. The participants’ opinions of the location and presence 
awareness system that was presented in the storyboard scenario varied a lot. The 
family men saw no use for it;  they would not share their presence and location with 
others, only maybe for staying in touch with their family when traveling. The 
grandmother doubted the usability and usefulness of the new technology. The single 
woman would like to know the availability for communication of her family and 
friends, but she would not share her availability with them. That is, an asymmetric 
attitude towards the information. The teenage girl didn’t trust the privacy protection 
of the system. Automatic identification wasn’t considered as a privacy risk. People 
assumed that if they would use it, they would also know the privacy risks.  Automatic 
presence notification was an ambiguous concept for the participants. They would 
prefer to set their own presence and availability for communication, but they also 
acknowledge that this would require too much effort. Also, they didn’t trust others to 
set their presence and availability. The young adults (in their twenties) were frequent 
users of MSN and Skype programs, but they rarely used the availability information. 
As message senders they ignored the status information as it is not always accurate 
because it is automatically set to ’away’ when the user is not active on the computer. 
As message recipients they used the status information to ignore incoming messages 
in a socially acceptable way. Automatic intervention to protect user’s privacy was 
considered neither useful nor desirable. According to the participants, it is rude, 
asocial and inconsiderate to shut off communication automatically without warning 
all the users involved.  
In sum, the most important ways in which people handle their privacy is to isolate 
themselves from other family members and outside interruptions. To achieve such 
isolation, they retreat to private rooms or have agreements for not being disturbed. 
They also use plausible excuses for not communicating. For example, ‘failure of 
technology’ to mask their real reasons like ‘not being in the mood to communicate’. 
Their strategies are rather ego-centric as they are more appreciative of being able to 
see someone else’s presence or availability than showing their own presence. They 
only tend to see the implications of their privacy settings, but not what the 
implications of these settings are for other people. 
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3  Sharing Presence Information - in the Field 
Isolation appears to be one of the most important strategies for people to protect their 
privacy in familiar communication situations. To understand how this behavior in 
actual privacy sensitive situations is affected, a field study was conducted in which 
presence information was shared between two connected homes. A functional 
prototype was placed in the homes that could be used for 2 weeks and for which the 
experiences of the users could be investigated. Perceived privacy was measured with 
questionaires that addressed five composite concepts: perceived social presence (4), 
perceived control (5), perceived effort, perceived connectedness and social presence 
(6). Automatic and manual presence detection conditions were used. 
3.1 Methodology 
Four pairs of friends/relatives participated in the study; one person per household. 
Two of the participant pairs had a parent-child relationship (children: mid-twenties; 
parents: mid-fifty), one pair were sisters (mid-twenties) and one pair were very close 
friends (mid-twenties). The two households were connected by two HomeLamp 
systems that showed the presence of persons in their homes. The systems supported a 
basic form of location-tracking to detect whether a person was at home or not. The 
HomeLamp-system consisted of a small-form-factor computer, an amBX-lamp and a 
sensing device for detecting wireless tags (7). The tags were attached to a key ring. 
They had a button for toggling between ’present’ and ’not present’ status. Users could 
set the presence status in the manual condition and override it in the automatic status. 
The range of detection was 300m. When people entered or left their home, their 
presence was detected by the system and shown by the lamp. The amBX-lamp 
generated different color patterns. Each participant had a personal color to indicate 
presence status. When a participant was at home, then this was also shown in the 
other home by light and color indication (Figure 1). The systems were permanently 
connected to the Internet and the presence information was shared by using the Jabber 
protocol. The information that is shown on one system, is identical to the information 
that is shown on the other, connected system. 
(a) participant A present (b) participant B present (c) both participants present
 
Fig 1: Presence status of participant A (light grey) and participant B (dark grey) as 
indicated by the lamp 
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3.2 Field Study Results 
The results of the questionnaires were summarized over all participants and analyzed 
separately for social presence, connectedness, social privacy and control and effort. In 
addition, the reliability of the rating scales was measured and if it was sufficiently 
high non-parametric tests were used to test the difference between the manual and 
automatic conditions. The ‘feeling of social presence’, was rated significantly higher 
in the automatic condition (mean rating 5.1) than in the manual condition (mean 
rating 4.5) on a scale of 1 (least) to 7 (most). The concepts ‘connectedness’ and 
‘social privacy’ were measured by means of 5 separate items: Expectations, Invasion 
of privacy, Obligations, Sharing experiences, Staying in touch, Thinking about each 
other. The ratings for these separate items showed large variability, meaning that the 
participants did not agree on them.  
The items for invasion of privacy are rated higher than the items for feelings of 
expectation and obligation. Thinking about each other and staying in touch are rated 
higher than sharing experiences. These differences were, however, not significant. 
The items concerning effort had slightly higher ratings with less variability across 
participants than the items concerning control. There were no clear differences 
between the automatic condition and the manual condition except for the amount of 
attention that the system required. 
The results of the interviews were analyzed and clustered based on consensus 
between two independent analyses of the audio data. The most salient groupings are 
reported here. They concern aspects of ‘perceived effort and control’ and ‘perceived 
sharing and connectedness’. 
3.2.1 Perceived Effort and Control 
People preferred the automatic condition over the manual condition. According to 
them, it would take too much effort; they had to think about it and conduct an 
intentional action to show being at home. Some participants wanted to be in control of 
the HomeLamp, irrespective of whether they used that control or not. Agreements 
were made between participants on how to use the HomeLamp. They preferred to 
show their availability rather than their presence, if it wouldn’t take too much effort to 
do so. The presence information was only shared with a very small group of close 
relatives and friends and didn’t go beyond sharing more information than their 
availability or presence in the house. Detailed location information as well as detailed 
activity information was considered to be too privacy sensitive. The information in 
the manual condition was considered less reliable than the information in the 
automatic condition because participants occasionally forgot to turn the HomeLamp 
on (in the manual condition) and they also expected the other party to forget it as well.  
3.2.2 Perceived Sharing and Connectedness 
Most participants preferred a social solution over using the system for sharing their 
availability. They preferred to simply tell the other person that they were not available 
instead of using the system to show this. The HomeLamp increased a feeling of 
connectedness, which was in most cases a positive feeling. However, for the parent-
child relationships it felt sometimes as an overload of information. Children felt being 
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monitored and parents became anxious when their child, for example, was not present 
or did not answer a call when expected. Friends or sibling pairs did not associate 
negative feelings with such unexpected situations. Multi-person situations between 
household members did not pose specific privacy issues for the participants. The 
children in the parent-child relation used deception. They felt uncomfortable about 
hiding information, but they also felt forced to use such deception.  
In addition to the responses of the participants to the interview questions, specific 
observations were made. First, everybody has a different kind of Internet connection 
and households with more than one person, usually have one person who is the 
administrator. Second, people didn’t feel monitored in the automatic condition. The 
only comparative comments for the manual and the automatic conditions concerned 
the difference in effort and the difference in reliability. Third, the behavior of the 
participants in the manual condition showed that they became more casual with 
regard to turning the lamp on or off when they changed their presence situation. 
3.3 Conclusions  
For most participants the HomeLamp definitely increased their feeling of 
connectedness. But, this benefit also depended on how they normally keep in touch. 
As for the conditions, the manual condition took too much effort. The feeling of 
social presence is higher for the automatic than for the manual condition. Arguably, 
this might be connected with the fact that the perceived reliability of the manual 
presence indication was low because participants sometimes forgot to use the system.  
Sharing information about being home is about as detailed as the participants liked it. 
More detailed information was generally considered to be too privacy sensitive. 
However, this remains a matter of subjective preferences and depends on how well 
the other can interpret the information. Participants only wanted to share their location 
information with a small group of people. Sharing information might not only have a 
negative effect on the sharer, but also on the receiver. Too much information might 
lead to anxiety, especially if the receiver has some sort of caring function.  
In short, this field study showed that people will share their information with only a 
small group of close relatives and friends, the sharing of the location information 
should have a clear benefit, users need a feeling of being in control and the desired 
level of detail of the location information is subjective. Furthermore, the large 
variability in the behavior of people in privacy sensitive situations induced by, for 
example, presence sharing applications has implications for the design and use of 
awareness systems. Individual differences, varying social relations and application 
specifics have to be considered. 
4  Maintaining Privacy in Application Specific Situations – Using 
Different Types of Noise 
To investigate what people do to maintain their privacy in application-specific privacy 
sensitive situations, a conceptual design study was conducted. The focus of this study 
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was on how people want to hide information that is being shared to maintain their 
privacy. One of the most important conclusions from the HomeLamp field study was 
that people want control over the level of detail in which their information is shared. 
Price et al. (8) propose a model for user control of privacy that incorporates ”noise” 
by introducing ambiguities in the information. This model deals specifically with 
location and identity information and is divided into five types of “noise”:  
• Anonymizing: hiding the identity of the user.  
• Hashing: disguising the identity of the user.  
• Cloaking: making the user invisible.  
• Blurring: decreasing the accuracy of the location  
• Lying: giving intentionally false information about location or identity.  
The conceptual design study investigated how well these noise forms fit extended 
home environment applications and which noise forms are desired by the users.  
4.1 Methodology 
People’s perceived privacy is influenced by how they appreciate the usefulness of 
presence sharing information. To study these effects, application concepts were used 
for which the perceived usefulness differs. The following application concepts were 
investigated: 1) the sharing of photos, 2) the sharing of location, that is, knowing 
where the other person is, and 3) the sharing of health information. Participants were 
shown sketches of these concepts. The information that could possibly be privacy 
sensitive was identified for each application concept and noise forms from (8) were 
adapted to each of them. Participants were asked to evaluate three application 
concepts and indicate in what form they would want to share their data. The 
participants (N=18, age 25-52 yrs.) were asked with whom they would like to share 
the application and in which context they would use it. They also had to rank the 
applications according to their preferences. Three tasks were carried out for each 
application and participants had to indicate and explain which noise forms they 
would: (a) optionally want in the proposed application, (b) have as their default 
setting, and (c) rank highest regarding perceived importance. A thinking-aloud 
methodology was used (9). Cards were used to present each information type. An 
example of the task presentation and its setting is shown in (Figure 2).  
4.2 Results  
The photo sharing application was preferred the most, followed by sharing health 
information. Least preferred was sharing location information. The preferences for 
noise forms differed per application. Correlation between rankings was calculated 
using the Kendall coefficient of concordance.  
8 
 
Fig.2 Example of task assignment for the conceptual design study. This application can 
unobtrusively monitor your health, for example your blood pressure and weight, but also other 
health factors can be measured. Each morning the information is collected and sent for example 
to your physician, or to your sport coach, etc. How would you handle these situations and 
which noise forms (exact data, less detail, free data choice, no show) would you select in each 
situation? 
The ranking results are shown in Table 1.  The rankings for the photo sharing 
application showed that no background video and audio is preferred over blurring the 
background video and distorting the audio. Regarding identity, the use of nicknames 
(hashing) and partial identity (blurring) was preferred over using a chosen identity 
(lying). Partial identity (blurring) was liked the most and showing no identity 
(anonymizing) the least for the location sharing application. Showing their location in 
less detail (blurring) was preferred over giving a free-choice location (lying). For the 
location information sharing application settings there was less agreement amongst 
the participants then for the photo sharing application settings. Agreement among 
participants was highest for the health information sharing application. Sharing the 
exact weight and blood pressure (no noise) was preferred above a chosen weight and 
blood pressure (lying). Sharing their exact identity (no noise) was liked the most and 
sharing a chosen identity (lying) was liked the least. 
Table 1. Ranking results for Photo sharing, Location sharing and Health sharing applications as 
participants’ choices (n=18). 
Noise form Card sorting choice  Default choice*  
 Photo Sharing Application 
Identity   
• Exact identity 9 5 
• Partial identity 15 9 
• Use of nick name 13 4 
• Chosen identity 8 0 
• No identity 6 0 
Video   
• Full view 17 4 
• Blur 6 0 
• No background 13 7 
• No video 12 4 
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Audio   
• All audio 14 5 
• Voice only 17 11 
• Fade audio 2 0 
• Distort audio 5 0 
• No audio 10 1 
 Location Sharing Application 
Identity   
• Exact id 9 5 
• Partial id 15 9 
• Nick name 13 4 
• Chosen id 8 0 
• No id 6 0 
Location   
• Exact location 12 3 
• Less detail 17 11 
• Chosen location 9 0 
• No location 13 3 
 Health Sharing Application 
Identity   
• Exact id 15 9 
• Partial id 10 3 
• Nick name 6 3 
• Chosen id 4 1 
• No id 8 2 
Blood pressure   
• Exact blood pressure 18 10 
• Less detail 11 4 
• Chosen blood pressure 1 0 
• No blood pressure 8 3 
Weight   
• Exact weight 18 10 
• Less detail 8 4 
• Chosen weight 1 0 
• No weight 10 3 
* Not all participants could make a choice 
4.3 Conclusions  
The highest level of agreement was found for the use of video and audio background 
information as noise in the photo sharing application and for weight and blood 
pressure data in the health application. That is, people don’t want to protect their 
privacy by blurring video and audio backgrounds if they share photo’s and they don’t 
want to lie about their blood pressure and weight if it is for their health’s benefit. The 
lowest level of agreement was found for identification information in photo sharing 
and sharing health information, that is, there is no common preference in noise form 
to mask identity information. 
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In sum, there was no decisive result, but in general, giving less detailed information is 
preferred over exact information. This confirms also the findings from the HomeLamp 
field study. Participants provided a multitude of contexts for which they would use 
different noise forms to maintain social norms and values. Preferences for noise forms 
differed per application. These contexts are quite complex, as they dynamically 
change depending on with whom the information is shared and on the participant’s 
perceived benefit. In general people prefer to share information at the lowest level of 
detail that is appropriate but they desire to add noise (e.g. by lying) for social 
acceptability. This implies that it should be easy for users to switch between noise 
forms depending on the dynamic nature of the context. 
5 Conclusion 
We started our research into perceived privacy in ambient intelligent environments in 
an exploratory fashion, followed by a targeted study that involved limited implication 
effects and continued by studying different application specific contexts. Within this 
approach, we limited the scope of the studies to the specific environment provided by 
the Amigo project to provide input and guidance to the design of the Amigo system. 
During the exploratory study, people were asked about their daily communications 
and related privacy issues. In the field study, a system for presence detection in the 
home and sharing that information across homes was developed and evaluated. The 
conceptual design study was conducted to find out how people would like to be able 
to mask or hide information that is being shared between different parties for three 
different types of applications. The main conclusions are: 
• people use many diverse mechanisms to preserve their social privacy,  
• people will share their personal information only with a small group of close 
relatives and friends,  
• information sharing should have a clear benefit for users,  
• users should have the possibility to control the level of detail of the information 
that is being shared, and  
• users need a feeling of being in control, for example, automatic location detection 
is appreciated by users, but they also need to be able to influence the automatic 
detection mechanism. 
5.1 System Design Implications 
Although the qualitative and quantitative results and observations from the user 
studies provided a wealth of information on the perceived privacy of users. They 
didn’t provide information on how data should be secured, stored, or encrypted to 
support and advice application development. Initially, it was proposed to handle 
privacy at the middleware service level of the Amigo architecture by means of a rule-
based filter that incorporated the user’s preferences and that would use the 
preferences to either pass on the data or not. Our field and concept studies showed, 
however, that such a mechanism for privacy filtering on the Amigo services level is 
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not sufficient. Although there is definitely a need for a component that handles and 
stores the user’s privacy preferences, it is not sufficient for protecting the user’s 
perceived privacy, because it does not offer direct user control. Privacy should also be 
handled at application level. In particular, the type of information that is shared, the 
level of detail in which the information is shared, and with whom the information is 
shared (for example, with groups or individuals), are the most important concepts to 
take into account. 
 
In addition to the implications for the system architecture, design guidelines could be 
derived from the results of the qualitative and quantitative studies to support the 
development of extended home environment applications. First of all, the most 
important rule to take into account is: ‘Maximize benefit, minimize effort and provide 
reasonable control for the end-user’. In addition to this rule, the following design 
guidelines need to be accounted for: 
1. Provide proper security and inform users of security measures  
2. Provide control on several levels  
3. Present the user with a choice of level of detail in which the information should be 
shared  
4. Provide clear feedback over shared information  
5. Never automatically share information without user consent  
6. Avoid using automatic intervention to maintain user privacy. 
These guidelines were worked out with a detailed description, a general problem 
statement, examples from the Amigo extended home application scenario and a 
validation (example in Table 2). These guidelines complement existing guidelines for 
designing for privacy such as the OECD guidelines (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, (10) and the guidelines from Langheinrich (11). 
While, the latter are very generally applicable and refer mainly to the collection of 
data, our guidelines are specific for applications in the extended home environment 
and focus on the sharing of data in a social context. 
 
Table 2. Example design guideline # 3 
Design 
guideline #3 
Present the user with a choice of level of detail in which the 
information should be shared 
Detailed 
description: 
Each type of information can be shared in several levels of detail and it 
should be possible for the user to adapt the level of detail to the context in 
which the information is shared.  
General 
problem: 
Although sharing information in the most exact way can sometimes be 
useful, users often feel a breach in privacy when they are forced to share 
their exact information all the time. 
Example: John and Maria share information about their physical condition, such as 
blood pressure and weight, while exercising. However, they only share 
whether the information is above or below the threshold. This way they can 
motivate and warn each other, but they don’t feel monitored by each other. 
Validation: In the HomeLamp study, users felt comfortable with the system registering 
when they were either at home or not, and sharing this information. When 
offered the option of sharing detailed information, e.g. sharing information 
12 
Design 
guideline #3 
Present the user with a choice of level of detail in which the 
information should be shared 
about in which room they were located, users indicated that they would not 
use this as they felt that they were monitored: ”Suppose that the system 
would show [my friend] that I was in my bedroom for an hour during the 
day, what would she think?! No, that’s too much information.” 
 
In sum, the guidelines address the following aspects: levels of security, means for 
end-user control, levels of detail of the shared information, types of feedback to the 
end user, appropriateness for automatic sharing of information, and possibilities for 
automatic intervention for maintaining privacy. These guidelines are formulated in 
such a way that they can be used by system developers to create services and 
applications that are privacy-safe from an end-user’s point of view. 
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Abstract. Trust is the cornerstone of traditional business transactions and a lack 
of trust is one of the main inhibitors on the future growth of Electronic 
Commerce. However, trust is a nebulous social construct that is further 
complicated by its context dependence.  Our assertion is that through study of 
the contextual artifacts and the process of trust formation in traditional business 
settings, we can devise a logic-based model that adequately captures the 
constructs needed to enable the automated creation of trusted Electronic 
Commerce transactions. In this paper, we introduce a model, called E2T2, 
which enables the creation of trust-based relationships between online 
merchants and their consumers.  
Keywords: Logic, Trust, Trust Management. 
1   Introduction 
Trust is important to the transition to the next level of Electronic Commerce 
innovation.  Without technology assurances that software is built on robust, verifiable 
trust technology, further consumer acceptance of online commercial innovations is 
likely to be slow.  
The state of the art in commercial trust technology, e.g. KeyNote [1] and 
REFEREE [2], is very effective at mapping security credentials to access rights in 
static environments [3].  However, security constraints are only one facet of the trust 
problem.  Other facets that are often ignored by security-focused trust solutions 
include reputation, risk propensity and past behavior [4].  Though systems have been 
built to address each of these and many other facets individually, there is no single 
underlying and unifying model that incorporates all the important aspects needed for 
Electronic Commerce. 
The current set of logic-based trust models [5-7] suffers the same fate as their 
‘authorization-centric’ trust management engineering counterparts.  They focus on 
specific aspects of the trust problem, without taking all the dimensions of a business 
transaction into consideration.   
The aim of our model, E2T2 (Epistemic Event Temporal Trust), is to show that it 
is possible to create a model that encapsulates the decision factors and that can be 
implemented for any arbitrary E-Commerce application environment.  While E2T2 is 
not complete, we believe that the model is flexible enough to allow adaptation to 
arbitrary application domains and facilitate the inclusion of emerging issues and 
concepts as they materialize.  
We present the background notions needed for this discussion in section 2 and 
describe the basics of the E2T2 model in section 3. In section 4, we present how trust 
representation for Electronic Commerce is done in E2T2 and then round out the 
discussion on the auxiliary concepts needed for E-Commerce decision making 
(section 5). We conclude in section 6. 
2   Background 
Our work is grounded in several fields, namely: trust management [8,9], Electronic 
Commerce [4] and modal logic [10-15]. We introduce the base concepts in each of 
these areas.  
2.1   Trust 
Not all the definitions of trust in the computer science literature are applicable to 
Electronic Commerce [16].  For our context, we borrow from the definition used in 
[4] for trust in the E-Services environment, which states that “trust is the quantified 
belief by a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, security and dependability 
of a trustee within a specified context”, where dependability encapsulates timeliness 
and reliability. 
A trustor is defined as the subject of the relationship and a trustee the object.  For 
example, if Luke wishes to initiate the purchase of a large shipment of fertilizer from 
RedCo Chemicals, then Luke is the trustor in this instance and the object is RedCo 
Chemicals.  Luke’s decision to trust could be based on one or a combination of a 
myriad of different factors, e.g. RedCo’s reputation in the business community, a 
recommendation from one of Luke’s friends, RedCo’s SEC credentials or maybe even 
Luke’s personal past dealings with RedCo. These decision criteria are critical to the 
problem of establishing and evolving trust. 
Currently, there are two prevailing views of trust management. The first is the one 
defined by Blaze et. al. [1] that advocates an authorization-based approach to trust 
management. The other is a business-oriented approach [16] that examines trust 
management through the core mechanism used in successful E-Commerce 
applications, e.g. reputation.  We augment the latter approach in this paper. 
2.2   Decision-Making in Electronic Commerce 
When two entities, who may have no prior knowledge of each other, wish to engage 
in an Electronic Commerce transaction they must each ask themselves “Should I trust 
this entity and engage in this transaction (or not)?” The problem arises when each 
entity must choose the indicators that should be used to make this decision and 
request it from the other entity.   
The common solution has been to use security credentials, such as authentication 
tokens and attributes, to establish either identity or determine the allowable trusted 
tasks.  However, security credentials are as good as the issuer of these credentials, do 
not give any indication of past or present behavior and only partially resolve the 
problem of how to interact with strangers. In a nutshell, a lot of contextual 
information is missing. This highlights the fact that the common solutions need to be 
enhanced. 
In a standard electronic transaction e, where a wants to engage b, a must 
determine the level of trust or distrust and use this to take the most prudent course of 
action.  Apart from assurances on the competence, honesty, security, timeliness and 
reliability of b, a has business considerations to include in his trust decision.  From a 
purely commercial perspective, a favorable decision may depend on: 
1. Intrinsic properties of the transaction. 
2. Assurances about respecting a’s privacy. 
3. a’s experience with b (with respect to similar transactions). 
4. b’s past experience with others (who may be like a), with respect to similar 
transactions. 
5. b’s reputation in the community of interest. 
6. A recommendation on b’s behalf. 
Generally, these factors can be classified as either transaction-specific or event-
driven. Let’s briefly present each. 
2.2.1   Transaction-Specific Factors 
Transaction-specific trust decision criteria are intrinsic properties of a transaction, and 
include the associated risk, the transaction value, the insurance coverage for the 
transaction and any associated economic incentive (or disincentive) associated with 
performing the transaction.     
[4] purports that there are intuitive correlations between these factors and the final 
decision made. For example, transactions with a low risk value (in comparison to 
one’s risk threshold) tend to lead to a positive trust decision.  Under normal 
circumstances, a rational a considers a low-valued transaction trivial to his or her 
bottom-line and may not mind engaging with b, even if b is malicious and shatters all 
of a’s positive expectations.  Generally, low-valued transactions are deemed as 
having very little risk.  Normally, this is independent of an explicitly stated risk value 
for the transaction.  Thus, a low-valued transaction has a high probability of being 
viewed as beneath one’s risk threshold and often leads to positive trust decisions.   
A transaction that is insured, at least to the transaction value, can be recovered (in 
the worst case).  Having insurance lowers the risk threshold of a transaction.  
Normally, decisions involving insured transactions will not take the transaction’s 
value into account.  Instead the other factors involved in the decision will determine 
the outcome.  If insurance is the only (or dominant) factor, then there is a higher 
chance of a favorable trust decision. 
If b, or a third party, is willing to compensate a for engaging in e, to a level that a 
views as significant, then a will view the transaction as being below his risk threshold 
and thus be inclined to trust b and engage in the transaction.  Similar reasoning can be 
applied to the disincentive case, where a third party pays a not to proceed with the 
transaction. 
2.2.2   Event-Driven Factors 
Event-driven factors relate to activity, agreements, arrangements or information that 
occur either prior to or outside the scope of the current trust decision with 
consequences that extend beyond the existing decision.  For example, a’s body of 
knowledge concerning past encounters with b as it pertains to e constitutes 
information that occurred prior to the current decision and whose influence will 
extend beyond the decision.  Thus, experience, reputation, recommendation and 
privacy concerns all fall into this category. We will discuss these later in this paper. 
Grandison [4] offers a discussion on the treatment of the correlations between these 
factors and the trust decision outcome. We will only state here that in the case of 
privacy constraints, a’s rights can be protected by 1) a not releasing any private 
information or releasing a limited view [17], or 2) b asserting that it won’t violate a’s 
privacy and a actively monitoring the disclosures to and the activity performed by b, 
which seems to be infeasible in today’s computing environment.  If a privacy 
violation occurs, then this event will negatively impact the trust relationship. If no 
violation happens, then the relationship remains in tact. 
2.3   Logic 
In this section, we introduce the central concepts from epistemic logic and temporal 
logic. 
2.3.1   Epistemic Logic 
Epistemic logic [10,11] allows one to model complex scenarios involving knowledge 
and belief, by augmenting non-modal logic and leveraging the epistemic operators Kc 
and Bc such that KcA means Agent c knows A and BcA means Agent c believes A for 
some arbitrary proposition A.  The fundamental concept behind any modal logic is 
that of a possible world, each of them essentially being a model (in the logical sense) 
of the underlying non-modal logic.  In addition, each modal logic defines an 
accessibility relation between possible worlds, and different modal logics differ in the 
interpretation of this accessibility relation.  Thus, in an epistemic logic, two worlds w 
and w′ are accessible from each other for an agent c if both of them are compatible 
with c’s information state.  The notation used is Rcww′. World w′ is said to be an 
epistemic or a doxastic alternative to world w for agent c, depending on whether 
knowledge or belief is the attitude under consideration. 
2.3.2   Temporal Logic 
Temporal logic [14,15] allows the representation and reasoning about propositions 
that are qualified with a time component.  There are a number of different approaches 
in Computer Science to allow for temporal reasoning.  They range from the situation 
calculus of McCarthy and Hayes, which essentially captures the temporal dimension 
by adding a temporal term to each function and predicate symbol, to modal temporal 
logic, to reified temporal logic.  [19] provides an overview of the different approaches 
to incorporating a temporal dimension in a logical framework. 
Because of its greater expressive power, we adopt a reified approach in E2T2.  We 
distinguish between states and events, and we introduce the predicates  HOLDS and 
OCCURS to indicate that a particular state is true over a period time, or that an event 
occurs at some point in time. 
3   The Basics of the Model 
From our definition of trust, we see that a trust decision is based on an entity’s beliefs.  
Thus, our model must be founded on epistemic logic.  
As there are two parties in a typical Electronic Commerce transaction, it is safe to 
assume that each party has their own set of beliefs and that these will evolve over 
time.  Thus, the trust relationship is dynamic, in that the criteria or set of beliefs and 
one’s behavior may change over time based on trigger events. This highlights the 
need to incorporate some form of temporal logic. 
We will use a modal approach to modeling belief.  However, since trust is a 
quantified belief, we cannot rely on the standard modal operator BEL to model belief.  
Instead, we introduce a modal operator schema BELstr.  By convention, str ∈ <0, 1], 
i.e., a number larger than 0 and less than or equal to 1, and indicates the level of 
confidence that the agent has in the belief.  
We opt for a reified approach to temporal reasoning [18].  For our ontology, we 
adopt the formalism developed in [20], which introduces event and state tokens.  We 
ignore subtleties regarding the choice of temporal primitives. For an in-depth 
discussion, see [21].  For the purposes of this paper, we model time as a set of points. 
In the following sections, we introduce the basic vocabulary, individual terms and 
sentence construction in E2T2, then we present the semantic interpretation of the 
language constructs and highlight implications of our model’s design assumptions. 
3.1   The Language 
We will start with the basics, i.e. presenting the syntactic primitives of E2T2 and 
showing proper sentence construction in this formalism. 
3.1.1   The Basic Vocabulary 
When representing trust, we need to be able to talk about different types of entity.  
We therefore define E2T2 as a sorted logic with the following sorts: 
• I, Individuals (i, j, k, i1….in) 
• A, Agents, a sub-sort of individuals, (a,b,c,a1 … an) 
• T, Times (t1….tn) 
• S, States (s1….sn) 
• E, Events (e1….en) 
• N, the set of numbers between 0 and 1. 
E2T2 contains a number of function symbols.  Each n-place function symbol f has 
a signature Σf: v1,..,vn-1 → vn where v1,..,vn are sorts and v1,..,vn-1 specify the sorts of 
the input arguments and vn the sort of the output.   
E2T2 contains a number of predicate symbols.  Each n-place predicate p has a 
signature Πp v1,..,vn where v1.,,vn are sorts.  E2T2 contains the following special 
predicates: 
• BEF, with signature ΠBEF:T,T.  Intuitively, BEF(t1, t2) is true iff t1 is earlier than 
t2.  Although a full temporal logic will have to contain more predicates between 
times, this one temporal predicate is sufficient for our current purposes.  
• HOLDS, with signature ΠHOLDS:S,T,T.  Intuitively, HOLDS(s, t1, t2) is true iff 
state s is true between time t1 and t2. 
• OCCURS, with signature ΠOCCURS:E,T.  Intuitively, OCCURS(e, t) is true iff 
event e occurs at time t. 
Finally, E2T2 contains the 4–place modal operator BEL whose first three 
arguments are of type A, N and T respectively and whose final argument is a 
proposition.  Intuitively, BEL(a,str,t,p) indicates that a believes p with confidence 
level str at time t. 
3.1.2   Individual Terms 
Individual terms in E2T2 are defined in the normal way.  Thus: 
• Every constant is an individual term; 
• If f is a function symbol with Σf: v1,..,v n-1 → vn and z1,..,z n-1 are terms of 
sorts v1,..,v n-1 respectively, then f(z1.,,z n-1) is an individual term of sort vn 
3.1.3   Sentences 
In defining the syntax of E2T2, we make use of the following auxiliary notion: 
• If φ is a sentence and z and x terms of sort v then φ[z/x] is obtained by replacing 
all occurrences of z in φ by x 
Sentences in E2T2 are formed in the normal way, that is: 
• If p is an n-place predicate with signature Πp v1,..,vn and z1,..,zn are terms of 
sorts v1,..,vn  then p(z1,..,zn) is a sentence; 
• If φ and ψ are sentences, then so are ¬φ, (φ → ψ), (φ & ψ) and (φ ∨ ψ); 
• If φ is a sentence that contains terms z and x of sort v, then (∀x:v)[ φ(z/x)] and 
(∃x:v)[φ(z/x)] are sentences. 
• If φ is a sentence and a, str and t are terms of type A, N and T respectively, then 
BEL (a,str,t,φ) is a sentence. 
3.2   Semantics 
The semantics for E2T2 is relatively complicated as it has to combine elements from 
the semantics of temporal logic with elements of the semantics of epistemic logic.  
Moreover, because we deal with quantified belief, we cannot rely on the standard 
possible worlds approach to provide semantics for the belief modality.  We achieve 
the desired effect by complicating the accessibility relation between possible worlds. 
From an intuitive point of view, an E2T2 model consists of a set of individuals, 
suitably partitioned to take account of the different sorts in the language, a set of time 
intervals and a set of possible worlds.  The model contains an ordering relationship < 
between time intervals.  In addition, for each agent, we define an accessibility 
function that maps any two pairs of possible worlds at a particular point in time onto a 
number larger than 0 and less than or equal to 1.  This number indicates the likelihood 
that a world w’ is accessible from world w according to the agent at time t.  It is 
loosely based on Lewis’ complication of the standard possible world semantics to 
deal with counterfactuals [22] and will be used to deal with the confidence level that 
an agent has in different beliefs. 
With this in mind, we can now formally define an E2T2 model as follows: 
An E2T2 model M consists of 
a. A tuple <O, W, T> where 
• O, the set of objects is partitioned into 3 non-overlapping sets, I, S and E, 
the sets of individuals, states and events respectively, and I contains a non-
empty set A, the set of agents; 
• W is the set of possible worlds 
• T is the set of time intervals; 
• N is the set of numbers in the interval < 0, 1 ] 
b. A temporal ordering relation < over T. 
c. A function Acc that associates with each a ∈ A a 3-place function from W Χ W 
Χ T into N. 
d. An interpretation function ℑM. 
The interpretation function ℑM assigns an appropriate denotation to each 
expression in E2T2 in each world-time pair.  We use ℑM
 w,t(exp) as a short-cut 
notation for ℑM (exp, w, t). 
For primitive individual terms, it is defined in the standard ways: 
a. If z is a primitive term of sort v, then ℑM
 w,t (z) ∈ Corr(v), where Corr is a 
function mapping a sort into the corresponding set of objects.  Thus, 
Corr(A) = A, Corr(I) = I,  Corr(S) = S, Corr(E) = E, Corr(T) = T,  
Corr(N) = N. 
      In order to avoid the problem of trans-world identity, we stipulate that for all 
primitive terms ℑM
 w,t (z) = ℑM w’,t’ (z).  In other words, the denotation of a 
primitive term does not vary from world-time pair to world-time pair. 
b. If f is a function symbol with Sf: v1.,,vn-1 → vn then ℑM w,t (f) is a function from 
Corr(v1) Χ … Χ Corr(vn-1) into Corr(vn), and ℑM w,t (f(v1,..,vn-1)) = ℑM w,t (f)( ℑM 
w,t(v1),..,ℑM w,t (vn-1)) 
For predicates, ℑM is defined in the expected way as well: 
a. If p is an n-place predicate with signature Πp v1.,,vn , then, ℑM w,t (p) ⊆ (Corr(v1) 
Χ … Χ Corr(vn)) 
The only complication is that the interpretation of the special predicate BEF is the 
ordering relation between points in time. 
In order to define ℑM for sentences, we introduce an auxiliary notion, namely the 
set of all possible worlds that are accessible from a given world w according to actor 
a at time t with at least confidence level str; which is Acc(w, a, t, str).  Formally, 
this notion can be defined as follows:  
w’ ∈ Acc(w, a, t, str) iff Acc(a)(w, w’, t)  ≤ str 
Although this definition may at first glance seem counterintuitive, the reason for it 
will become clear in the following sections. 
With this concept, we can now extend ℑM to sentences.   ℑM maps each sentence to 
either 1 (true) or 0 (false) according to the following rules: 
a. ℑM
 w,t (p(v1,..,vn)) = 1 iff <ℑM w,t (v1),..,ℑM w,t (vn)> ∈      ℑM w,t (p) and 0 otherwise; 
b. ℑM
 w,t (¬φ) = 1 iff ( ℑM w,t (φ) = 0 ) , and 0 otherwise; 
c. ℑM
 w,t((φ → ψ)) = 1 iff ((ℑM w,t (φ) = 0) or  (ℑM w,t (ψ) = 1)), and 0 otherwise; 
d. ℑM
 w,t ((φ & ψ)) = 1 iff ( ℑM w,t (φ) = ℑM w,t (ψ) = 1 ) , and 0 otherwise; 
e. ℑM
 w,t ((φ ∨ ψ)) = 1 iff ( (ℑM w,t (φ) = 1) or  (ℑM w,t (ψ) = 1)), and 0 otherwise; 
f. ℑM
 w,t ((∀x:v)[φ]) = 1 iff for all ℑ’M which are exactly like ℑM  except for the value 
assigned to z, ℑ’M
 w,t (φ[x/z]) = 1 where z is a term of sort v not occurring in φ, and 0 
otherwise. 
g. ℑM
 w,t ((∃x:v)[ φ ]) = 1 iff there is an ℑ’M which is exactly like ℑM  except for the value 
assigned to z such that ℑ’M
 w,t (φ[x/z]) = 1 where z is a term of sort v not occurring in φ. 
h. ℑM
 w,t (BEL(a, str, t, φ) = 1) iff (for all w’ ∈ Acc(w, a, t’, str), ℑM w’,t (φ) = 1) where t’ = 
ℑM
 w,t (t) ) and 0 otherwise. 
The decisions taken in designing the syntax and semantics have led to interesting 
consequences, which are presented in Appendix A. 
4   Representing Trust 
In this section we use the logic framework of E2T2 to formalize the notion of trust.  
However, before we do so, we first introduce some special function symbol and 
predicates. 
4.1   Auxiliary Function and Predicate Symbols 
The first function symbol that we need is CANINDUCE with signature 
ΣCANINDUCE: A, E → S.  Intuitively, CANINDUCE(a,e) describes the state of a being 
able to bring about event e, either directly or through some third party   Often, the 
event will be some action that is performed by a. 
A second required function symbol is REQUEST with signature ΣREQUEST: A, A, 
E → E  Intuitively, REQUEST maps two agents and an event into an event, namely 
the event of the first agent requesting the second agent to bring about the event. 
A third function symbol is COMMIT with signature ΣCOMMIT: A, E, T → E  
Intuitively, COMMIT maps an agent, an event and a time into an event, namely the 
event of the agent committing itself to bring about event before that time. 
The final function symbol that we need is slightly more complicated, namely 
TPER, with the signature ΣTPER: A, A, E, T → T.  TPER takes two agents a and b, an 
event e, and a time t and maps this into a second time period t'.  We assume that agent 
b has committed to agent a to perform e at time t.  TPER returns the time by which 
agent a can reasonably expect agent b to have delivered on its commitment.  It 
reflects the intuition that, when an agent commits to do something, one can 
reasonably expect him or her to perform the action within a certain time period.  The 
time period that is reasonable clearly depends on the action committed to.  For an 
event like passing the salt at a dinner table, the period will be fairly short; for a 
promise made to an incoming student in a four year program to help her complete her 
degree successfully, the time period is longer. We stipulate that if x = TPER(a1, a2, 
e1, t1) then BEF(t1,x). This function is used to model timeliness, which is a crucial 
element of the trust formalism.      
4.2   Trust 
We are now in a position to give a preliminary definition of trust in terms of E2T2.  
We previously stated that for purposes, trust is the quantified belief by a trustor with 
respect to the competence, dependability, security and honesty of a trustee with 
respect to the trustee bringing about some event or state of affairs and in a specified 
context.   
With this in mind, we introduce a predicate TRUST with the signature ΠITRUST: A, 
N, A, T, E. Intuitively, TRUST(a,str,b,t,e) means that a trusts b at trust level str at 
time t to bring about event e.  Naively, we see that this trust relationship will only be 
established when a believes that b is currently competent to bring about e (in a timely 
manner), when a believes that b will always carry out commitments with respect to e 
when requested (in a timely manner), when a believes that b is currently secure and 
when a believes that b is currently honest.  It becomes clear that timeliness is an 
intrinsic requirement for all the other attributes, rather than a single explicit 
constraint.  
Further examination of the clauses reveals that there are multiple dimensions of 
time present. For example, with the competence and security clauses, we assume that 
the trustee is competent and secure for a reasonable period, while for the 
dependability clause we assume that whenever the trustor makes a request of the 
trustee to bring about some event, the trustee forms, within a reasonable time of the 
request being made, the intention of bringing about e in a timely manner.  All of this 
raises the question what time period is considered reasonable? The answer lies in a 
number of factors.  One factor is the agent who considers the period to be reasonable, 
or not.  Some agents are more patient than others.  The second factor is the person 
who is to bring about the event.  Although one might trust both a seven year old child 
and an adult to set the table, when asked to do so, one would expect the child to take 
longer than the adult.  The final factor is the event itself.  One would expect it to take 
longer to make a gourmet meal than it takes to make a cup of coffee. 
Let’s discuss the formulations of the exact clauses for each attribute. 
Competence: A competent entity is one that is able to perform or lead to the 
performance of an event.  In our framework, this translates to a’s belief that b is 
capable of bringing about e in a timely manner.  We formally define this as: 
BEL(a, str1, t, [ (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →  
                HOLDS(CANINDUCE(b,e), x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) ] 
a does not have to believe that b is capable of bringing about e in perpetuity. a 
merely has to believe that b can bring about event e within the period in which it is 
reasonable for a to expect b to bring about e.  Note that we also do not mean to imply 
that a needs to believe in b’s competence for the entire period in which it is 
reasonable for a to expect b to bring about e.  a can change its opinion at any time.  
The clause merely states that at the time at which a trust b to perform e, a believes 
that b is competent to bring about e in a reasonable timeframe. 
Dependability: Dependability refers to reliability and timeliness.  A reliable entity is 
one that performs an event when it is requested to do so.  A dependable entity is a 
reliable one that executes in a timely manner.  We formaslize this as: 
BEL(a, str2, t, (∀x:T) [OCCURS(REQUEST(a,b,e), x) → 
      (∃x’:T) (∃x’’:T) [BEF(x, x’) &  BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,REQUEST(a,b,e),x)) &    
      BEF(x’, x’’) & OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e, TPER(a,b,e,x)), x’’)]]) 
The clause states that a believes that whenever it requests of b to bring about e, 
then b will, within a reasonable period of the request being made, form the intention 
to bring about event e in a timely manner.  We use the function symbol TPER twice, 
to reflect two subtly different forms of timeliness.  In order to be considered reliable, 
a trustee has to meet two requirements.   
First, whenever the trustor makes a request, the trustee must, in a timely manner, 
respond to the request by making some commitment.  How long a period is 
reasonable depends on the request.  One would expect a friend to respond to a request 
to make a cup of coffee more quickly than he or she might respond to a request to 
marry you.  This element of timeliness is modeled in the first use of TPER.  
However, it is not enough for the trustee to merely make the commitment in a timely 
manner.  The trustee must also commit to bringing about whatever the trustor requests 
within reasonable timescales.  We model this aspect through the second use of TPER. 
An example may further clarify the distinction.  Assume that a trusts waitress b in 
Frank’s Diner to serve a meal.  a believes that whenever he orders a meal from b, i.e. 
requests b to serve him a meal, b will form the commitment to bring the meal after a 
makes the request.  However, a would not expect b to bring it the meal immediately, 
although there clearly is some limit to the amount of time that a would be prepared 
for the meal to arrive.   
Security: A secure entity is one that provides assurances on its safe operation and 
execution.   
BEL(a, str3, t, (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) [  BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →   
                    HOLDS(SECURE(b,e), x’, TPER(a,b,e,x))]) 
As was the case with our analysis of competence, a does not have to assume that b 
will be secure with respect to e for ever, but merely for the period in which it is 
reasonable for a to expect b to perform e after a has requested b to perform e.  
Again, as in the case of the competence attribute, it is also true that a can change its 
view about b’s security at any time. 
Honesty: A honest entity is one that is sincere with regards to its interactions, i.e. it 
does what it commits to doing. 
BEL(a, str4, t, (∀x:T)(∀x’:T) [OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e,x’), x) →           
     (∃x”:T)[BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, x”) &  OCCURS(e, x”)]]) 
The above states that a believes that whenever b has committed to bringing about 
e before some time, e will indeed occur before that time.  Thus, b is sincere with 
respect to its commitments. 
The Complete Formulation: Putting all the pieces together, we get the following 
formulation of trust:  
TRUST(a, CALC(str1, str2, str3, str4), b, t, e) ↔ 
BEL(a, str1, t, [ (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →  
                HOLDS(CANINDUCE(b,e), x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) ] 
  & BEL(a, str2, t, (∀x:T) [OCCURS(REQUEST(a,b,e), x) → 
      (∃x’:T) (∃x’’:T) [BEF(x, x’) &  BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,REQUEST(a,b,e),x)) &    
      BEF(x’, x’’) & OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e, TPER(a,b,e,x)), x’’)]]) 
  & BEL(a, str3, t, (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) [  BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →   
                    HOLDS(SECURE(b,e), x’, TPER(a,b,e,x))]) 
  & BEL(a, str4, t, (∀x:T)(∀x’:T) [OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e,x’), x)  
       → (∃x”:T)[BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, x”) &  OCCURS(e, x”)]])   (1) 
There are a number of issues that we wish to draw attention to. 
First, the term CALC(str1, str2, str3, str4) indicates that the trust level is dependent 
on the four quantified beliefs that make up the definition of trust.  Clearly, this raises 
the question about the actual definition of CALC, which may be domain-specific and 
or entity-related.  The exact mathematical formulae used to calculate the trust value 
may be as simple as arithmetic average or as complex as weighted statistical 
computation.  This paper is not focused on trust calculation and we will leave this 
issue until another occasion. However, there are a number of stipulations that we need 
to put on the function CALC.  First, we assume that the range of the function CALC 
is the interval [0,1].  Second, whatever function is chosen to implement CALC, it 
must be monotonically increasing.  We want to make sure that, as the confidence 
level in the trustor’s beliefs of either the trustee’s competence, dependability, security, 
or honesty with respect to e increases, then its trust level in the trustee to bring about 
e minimally does not decrease, and should probably increase.   
Second, Note that the model theory and the increasing monotonicity of CALC 
imply that if a trusts b at time t to bring about e at trust level n, then a also trusts b at 
time t to bring about e at trust level n’ where n’ is less than n.  After all, if a holds any 
belief at confidence level c, a also holds that belief at any confidence level less than 
c.  If a trusts b to bring about e at level n, where n is the result of applying the 
function CALC on the confidence levels of the beliefs in the competence, 
dependability, security and honesty of b, then a also believes in the competence, 
dependability, security and honesty of b at lower confidence levels.  Applying CALC 
to these lower confidence levels must, because of the increasing monotonicity of 
CALC, result in a value that is less than the original value.  Thus, 
TRUST(a, n, b, t, e) → (∀n’)[ (0 < n’ ≤ n) → TRUST(a,n’,b,t,e)] (2) 
Since n takes on a value greater than 0 and less than or equal to 1, it also follows 
that 
¬TRUST(a, n, b, t, e) → (∀n’)[ (n ≤ n’ ≤ 1) → ¬TRUST(a,n’,b,t,e)] (3) 
Our formulation of trust lends itself to the modeling of constructs needed for 
Electronic Commerce, which for purposes of brevity are presented in Appendix B. 
6   Conclusion 
Epistemic Event Temporal Trust (E2T2) is a logical framework that leverages 
knowledge on the trusting behavior of businesses to create a unifying model that 
allows all the components of the trust decision to be factored into the process of trust 
establishment.  The model’s design allows it to be flexible enough to model the 
trusting behavior of any arbitrary business environment.  
Our future works involves modeling the more troublesome notions that online 
entities must handle (e.g. partial information, uncertainty, etc.). We will also create 
E2T2 reasoning engines and evaluate their effectiveness. Finally, we will consider the 
best deployment mechanisms. 
The overall focus on the work on E2T2 is to provide a foundation for discourse in 
the research community and to underscore the importance of the need to take a 
holistic approach to the trust problem. 
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Appendix A: E2T2 Design Consequences 
Our definition of belief has a number of consequences that are worth mentioning.  
First, notice that, as any standard epistemic logic, our logic suffers from the problem 
of logical omnidoxasticity: 
(∀a:A) (∀n:N) (∀t:T) [ ((φ → ψ) & BEL(a, n, t, φ) ) → BEL(a,n,t, ψ) ] (4) 
Second, agents can change their minds, i.e. if an agent believes at time t that some 
event will occur at time t’ or that some state will hold at time t’, then it does not follow 
that it must believe at some other time t” that this event occurs or state holds at t’.  In 
other words, 
¬ (∀a:A)(∀n:N) (∀t, t’, t”:T)(∀e;E) [ BEL(a, n, t, OCCURS(e,t’)) → 
          BEL(a, n, t”, OCCURS(e,t’)) ]                                                              (5) 
¬ (∀a:A)(∀n:N) (∀t, t, t”:T)(∀s;S)  [ BEL(a, n, t, HOLDS(s,t, t’)) →   
          BEL(a, n, t”, HOLDS(e,t, t’’)) ]                                                            (6) 
After all, there is no requirement that all the worlds that are accessible from some 
given world at time t, are also accessible from that world at another time. 
Third, if an agent believes a proposition with a certain confidence level, then it will 
also believe that proposition with a lower confidence level.  In other words: 
(∀a:A)(∀n, n’:N)(∀t:T) [ ( BEL(a, n, t, φ ) & (n’ < n) ) → BEL(a, n’, t, φ) ]  (7) 
This proposition follows directly from the way in which we defined Acc(w, a,,t, 
str) as the set of possible worlds that were accessible from w according to a at time t 
with a confidence level of at least str.  Clearly, it follows that if a proposition φ is true 
in all worlds that are accessible from some world w according to a at time t with at 
least confidence level n, then it must also be true in all worlds that are accessible with 
a lower confidence level. 
Fourth, while it does follow that if an agent believes the negation of a proposition 
with a certain confidence level, then it does not believe that proposition with any 
confidence level, it does not follow that if an agent does not believe a proposition 
with a certain confidence level, then it believes the negation of that proposition.  In 
other words, 
¬(∀a:A)(∀t:T)(∀n:N) [ ¬ BEL(a, n, t, φ ) → (∃n’)[ BEL(a, n’, t, ¬φ) ]   (8) 
(∀a:A)(∀t:T)(∀n:N)    [ BEL(a, n, t, ¬φ ) → ¬(∃n’)[ BEL(a, n’, t, φ) ]                 (9) 
Again, the above follows directly from the way in which the model theory has been 
defined.  An agent not believing a proposition with a certain confidence level merely 
means that there is at least one possible world that is accessible with that confidence 
level in which the negation of that proposition is true; it certainly does not follow that 
the negation of the proposition must be true in all possible worlds that are accessible 
with an arbitrary confidence level.  On the other hand, if an agent believes the 
negation of a proposition with an arbitrary confidence level, then the negation of that 
proposition must be true in all worlds that are accessible with a certain confidence 
level, and that, no matter what confidence level one considers, there is always at least 
one possible world in which the proposition is false. 
Fifth, because denotations of primitives are unique across possible worlds and 
function symbols and predicates, other than BEF, varies from possible world to 
possible world, it is possible to tailor the model to any particular world of interest 
(e.g. an auction website, a manufacturing system, etc). 
Appendix B: Electronic Commerce Constructs in E2T2 
From [4], we know that mathematical properties such as transitivity, asymmetry, etc. 
cannot be axioms of any trust model simply because they are not universally 
applicable across domains.  Given the way in which we have formulated the model 
theory, none of these properties are axioms. However, each property could be 
modeled in E2T2 if it was applicable to the domain of interest. 
In this section, we highlight the notions of distrust, trust dynamism and risk. 
5.1   Distrust 
Distrust can be conceptually viewed as simply a lack of trust.  Formally, it is the 
quantified belief by a trustor that a trustee is incompetent, undependable, not secure 
and or dishonest with respect to bringing about some event or state of affairs for a 
specified context.  For example, if a does not believe in b’s ability to competently 
execute event e, then a may distrust b to execute e.  The same holds true for all the 
other attributes. 
 ¬ BEL(a, str1, t, [ (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →  
                HOLDS(CANINDUCE(b,e), x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) ] 
   ∨  ¬ BEL(a, str2, t, (∀x:T) [OCCURS(REQUEST(a,b,e), x) → 
      (∃x’:T) (∃x’’:T) [BEF(x, x’) &  BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,REQUEST(a,b,e),x)) &    
      BEF(x’, x’’) & OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e, TPER(a,b,e,x)), x’’)]]) 
   ∨  ¬ BEL(a, str3, t, (∀x:T) (∀x’:T) [  BEF(x, x’) &  
        BEF(x’, TPER(a,b,e,x)) →  HOLDS(SECURE(b,e), x’, PER(a,b,e,x))]) 
   ∨  ¬ BEL(a, str4, t, (∀x:T)(∀x’:T) [OCCURS(COMMIT(b,e,x’), x)  
       → (∃x”:T)[BEF(x, x’) & BEF(x’, x”) &  OCCURS(e, x”)]]) 
↔ ¬ TRUST(a, CALC(str1, str2, str3, str4), b, t, e)   (10)  
Note that the confidence levels now measure the lack of confidence.   
Distrust is not the same as the trust not to do something.  Thus, let us define two 
events e and e’ as incompatible if whenever event e occurs, event e’ does not occur 
and vice versa.  More formally: 
INCOMPATIBLE(e,e’) ↔ (∀t)[ OCCURS(e,t) ↔ ¬ OCCURS(e’,t)] (11) 
Neither of the following hold: 
(INCOMPATIBLE(e,e’) & TRUST(a,n,b,t,e)) → ¬TRUST(a,n,b,t,e’) (12) 
(INCOMPATIBLE(e,e’) & ¬TRUST(a,n,b,t,e)) → TRUST(a,n,b,t,e’)  (13) 
In other words, the fact that a does not trust b to bring about e, does not mean that a 
trusts b to bring about the opposite of e, or the fact a trusts b to bring about e does 
not mean that a does not trust b to bring about the opposite of e.  (12) does not hold 
because belief on my part in your competence, dependability, security and honesty 
with respect to e does not imply that I must believe you are either incompetent, 
undependable, insecure or dishonest with respect to the opposite of e.  (13) does not 
hold because the fact that I do not believe in your competence, dependability, security 
or honesty with respect to e does not imply that I believe in your competence, 
dependability, security and honesty with respect to the opposite of e. 
5.2   Trust Dynamism 
A trust relationship evolves as new experiences and new information is added and 
incorporated.  
There are two circumstances that can lead to a change in a trustor’s trust level in a 
trustee to bring about some event.  The first circumstance is simply a change in one of 
the constituent beliefs of the trust relationship, i.e., the belief that the trustor is 
competent, dependable, secure and honest.  Thus, the trust that I had in WorldCom (in 
2001) morphed into distrust when I discovered that their accounting practices were 
dishonest and misleading. 
A second circumstance in which a trustor’s level may change is the occurrence of 
some event, which although it changes the trust level, cannot immediately be traced to 
one of the constituent beliefs.  For example, I may lose the trust in my insurance agent 
to get me the best rate on my car insurance, but I may not be sure whether this is due 
to his incompetence, or dishonesty.  In order to model this situation, we introduce the 
predicate IMPACTS whose signature is ΠIMPACTS: E,A,A,E,N.  Intuitively, 
IMPACTS(e,a,b,e’,r) is true if the occurrence of the event e impacts the level of 
trust that a has in b to bring about e’ by r, where r is a ratio.  The ratio is negatively 
correlated to the amount of confidence I already have.  That is, the more I already 
trust you, the less my confidence increases when there is a new positive experience.  
This ensures that repeated occurrences of the same positive experience do not 
increase my confidence level to the same extent every time they occur.  We can now 
introduce the following axiom to model trust dynamism: 
(∀t:T) [(TRUST(a, n, b, t, e) & OCCURS(e’,t) & IMPACTS(e’,a,b,e,w)) →  
                  TRUST(a, n*(1+w), b, t+1,e)]                                                         (14) 
Thus, if  a trusts b to perform e with trust level n at time t, and at time t some 
event e’ occurs that impacts a’s trust in b to bring about e by ratio w, then a’s trust 
level in b to bring about e at the next point in time has changed by ratio w.   
The notion of impact can also be used to distinguish between positive and negative 
experiences.  An experience is an event that one has participated in.  Trust 
interactions that are recorded and can be referenced in the future constitute one’s 
experiences.  The value of experience is that it can be used to enhance the quality of a 
decision.  Experience is used to increase the probability of a favorable outcome and 
reduce the risk profile of a relationship.  In essence, using experience to guide trust 
decisions makes life (and the trust decision process) simpler.  A positive experience 
implies an increased confidence level, while a negative experience implies a lowered 
confidence level (even distrust).  In other words, a positive experience is an event that 
positively impacts the trustor’s trust level in the trustee, while a negative experience 
negatively impacts it.  The trust level that a trustor has in a trustee with respect to 
some event is the result of the cumulative experiences that the trustor has had 
regarding the trustee with respect to the event.  
There is a specific class of negative experiences that are worth mentioning.  When 
a trusts b to bring about e, a believes in b’s competence, dependability, security and 
honesty with respect to e, and a therefore expects b to behave competently, 
dependably, securely and honestly with respect to e.  b behaving competently, 
dependably, securely and honestly with respect to e is therefore likely to have no 
impact on a’s trust level.  However, the same cannot be said for any violation of any 
of these expectations.  Thus, if a experiences b behaving incompetently, 
undependably, unsecurely or dishonestly with respect to e, then a’s trust level in b to 
bring about e will be negatively impacted. 
Finally, the experience that impacts the trustor’s trust level in the trustee with 
respect to some action can be a purely cognitive experience, such as learning about an 
entity’s reputation or receiving a recommendation from a third party. The concepts of 
experience, reputation, recommendations, business confidence, diffidence, 
expectation, reliance and deception can all be modeled using the construct defined 
above. 
5.3   Risk 
There is a clear relationship between trust and uncertainty.  After all, in general, when 
a trustor trusts a trustee to bring about an event, the trustor cannot be absolutely 
certain that a trustee will bring about the event.  Because of the inherent uncertainty in 
a trust relationship, a trust relationship carries a certain risk, where risk can be 
regarded as the possibility or probability of incurring harm or loss.  The extent to 
which a trustor is willing to take the risk associated with the trust relationship clearly 
depends on the trustor, the trustee and the nature of a particular transaction.  Some 
trustors have a lower risk threshold than others, i.e. they are less risk-averse than 
others, and some trustees are inherently more trustworthy than others, no matter the 
transaction.  Finally, trustors are more likely to trust trustees with respect to events 
that are less likely to cause harm to the trustor. 
In order to model the relationship between risk and trust, we introduce the function 
symbol THRESHOLD with signature ΣTHRESHOLD: A,A,E,T → N.  Intuitively, 
THRESHOLD(a,b,e,t) describes the upper bound on a‘s willingness to take the risk 
to engage b to perform event e at time t.  If a’s trust in b to perform e exceeds 
THRESHOLD(a,b,e,t) then a is willing to engage b to perform e at time t as a is 
certain that any request for b to perform e will result in e occurring within a 
reasonable period of the request being made.  In other words 
(∀t:T)[(TRUSTS(a, n, b, t, e) & (n > THRESHOLD(a,b,e,t) &  
           OCCURS(REQUESTS(a,b,e), t) → BEL(a,(∃t’:T) 
                   (t’ < TPER(a,b,e,t) & OCCURS(e,t’))]                                                (15) 
Risk-averse entities will trust if their thresholds are not exceeded, whereas risk-
loving entities do the opposite.  
The important observation here is that confidence levels and risk thresholds are in 
the same numerical range and can be compared because there is a semantic 
equivalence.  It should be noted that risk thresholds can be compared to explicitly 
derived risk values, from transaction-specific and event-driven trust decision factors. 
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Abstract. With the emergence of small devices equipped with wireless
communication, several sophisticated systems for search and rescue have
been proposed and developed. However, a key obstacle in a wide de-
ployment of these systems has been users’ security and privacy. On one
hand, such systems need to collect as much information about a user as
possible in order to locate that user in a timely manner. On the other
hand, this very capability drives users away from using such a system.
This paper describes work-in-progress in building a security and privacy
framework for CenWits, which is a new search and rescue system for
people in emergency situation in wilderness areas. The paper focuses on
the role of context in building this framework.
1 Introduction
Search and rescue of people in emergency situation in a timely manner is an
extremely important service. In the past, it was difficult to build such a service
because of a lack of timely information needed to determine the current location
of a person who may be in an emergency situation. However, with the emer-
gence of small computing devices such as PDAs, sensors and cell phones that
have wireless communication capabilities, it has become feasible to build such
a system. Indeed, several such systems have been proposed and prototypes of
some of them have been implemented over the last five years [12, 1, 5, 6, 4].
We have designed and implemented a search and rescue system called Cen-
Wits[21] for a wilderness environment. A key differentiating feature of CenWits
from the other recent search and rescue systems is that it is designed for a
wilderness environment. In such an environment, there is no Internet connectiv-
ity, no cellular network, and building an adhoc network is infeasible due to an
extremely sparse environment. Furthermore, GPS reception is only available at
limited areas. CenWits (Connection-less Sensor-Based Tracking System Using
Witnesses) is comprised of three components: (1) mobile, in-situ sensors that
are worn by people (e.g. hikers); (2) access points (AP) that collect information
from these sensors; and (3) GPS receivers and location points (LP) that provide
location information to the sensors. A subject uses GPS receivers (when it can
connect to a satellite) and LPs to determine its current location. The key idea of
CenWits is that it uses a concept of witnesses to convey a subject’s movement
and location information to the outside world. This averts a need for maintain-
ing a connected network to transmit location information to the outside world.
In particular, there is no need for expensive GSM or satellite transmitters, or
maintaining an adhoc network of in-situ sensors in CenWits.
Since a search and rescue system like CenWits must track the movement of
people, there are some very obvious and important security and privacy issues. In
fact, such systems must cope with two conflicting issues. On one hand, the system
requires a collection of as much information about the location and movement of
a person as possible. This is to ensure that a smaller and more accurate search
area may be determined in case that person goes missing, or is in emergency
situation. Indeed, it is in the interest of a person to give out as much information
as possible about his/her location and movement to improve his/her chances of
being located and rescued in case of emergency. On the other hand, a majority
of people are not comfortable in giving out too much information about their
location and movement for the fear that such information may be misused for
malicious purposes, e.g. stalking. Indeed, this latter reason has proved to be a
major hindrance in a wider deployment of CenWits.
It is clear that appropriate security and privacy support must be provided
in a search and rescue system for wide acceptance. At present, we are designing
a security framework for CenWits. In this paper, we describe a preliminary
design of this framework, and discuss some important issues in the design and
implementation of security and privacy support for a search and rescue system
in general. An important observation is that there is no single security model
that can be applied in such a system. The required security and privacy support
varies based on individuals as well as context. In this paper, we focus on the role
of context in the design of a security framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
overview of CenWits. Section 4 describes the role of context in building a security
and privacy framework for CenWits. Section 5 provides a high-level description
of a multi-level security and privacy framework for CenWits. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 CenWits: A Brief Overview
CenWits is a search and rescue system that makes use of smaller and cheaper
sensor devices. It has several important advantages over the other search and
rescue systems. These advantages include a loosely-coupled system that relies
only on intermittent network connectivity, power and storage efficiency, and low
cost. It solves one of the greatest problems plaguing modern search and rescue
systems: it has an inherent on-site storage capability. This means someone within
the network will have access to the last-known-location information of a victim,
and perhaps his bearing and speed information as well. It utilizes the concept of
witnesses to propagate information, infer current possible location and speed of
a subject, and identify hot search and rescue areas in case of emergencies.
The concept of witness works as follows. Whenever two or more hikers are
with in a close range (say 100 meters) of one another, their sensors can exchange
messages over a radio frequency. When two hikers, say A and B are in close range
of each other, the following message exchange takes place. A generates a witness
record that stores the following information: B was seen at this location at this
time. Similarly, B generates a witness record storing A was seen at this location
at this time. In addition, A sends all witness records in his/her memory to B,
and similarly, B send all witness records in his/her memory to A. Whenever a
hiker comes in close range of an access point (special computing devices that
have Internet connection to a control center), he/she dumps all witness records
in his/her memory to the access point.
A prototype of CenWits has been implemented using MICA2 sensor 900MHz
running Mantis OS 0.9.1b. We have experimented with it in a number of indoor
and outdoor environments.
3 Related Work
A survey of location systems for ubiquitous computing is provided in [11]. These
include [17], [19], [8], and [1]. These systems are mainly designed for an indoor
environment, and not useful for our purpose. A system that is viable in suburban
area where a user can see clear sky and has GSM cellular reception at the same
time is [5]. Since, cellular reception is not available in wilderness areas, this
system is not useful for our purpose.
Personal Locater Beacon (PLB) that uses RF transmitter has been used
for avalanche rescuing for years. Luxury version of PLB that combines a GPS
receiver and a COSPAS-SARSAT satellite transmitter this also available [4].
Both of these devices are impractical in wilderness environment because of sig-
nificantly large space and/or expensive satellite transmitter. Another related
technology in widespread use today is the ONSTAR system [3], typically used in
several luxury cars. Like PLBs, this system has several limitations for use in a
wilderness environment, including heavy-weight, expensive, and requirement for
a connected network. The Lifetch system uses a GPS receiver board combined
with a GSM/GPRS transmitter and an RF transmitter in one wireless sensor
node called Intelligent Communication Unit (ICU). Again, this system requires
a connected network, which is not possible in a wilderness environment.
As far as we know, there is no work done yet in the area of building a security
and privacy framework for a search and rescue system in a wilderness environ-
ment. The main difficulty in building this framework is the absence of any kind
of infrastructure, be it a communication network or a public key infrastructure.
Furthermore, the actual level of security and privacy needed in this environment
varies based on circumstances as well as individuals’ perception of danger. Our
goal is make use of existing security principles and techniques, and adapt them
meet the requirements of our system.
4 Motivation and Context Awareness
The amount of security and privacy support that a search and rescue system
in a wilderness area should provide at any specific moment is strongly context
dependent. There are two types of contexts involved here: situational and per-
sonal. Situational context refers to the level of danger as perceived by a person.
Personal context refers to the level of comfort that a person has in divulging
information about his/her movement. As a part of situational context, some sit-
uations may be perceived more dangerous than others, e.g. a sudden storm or a
flash flood. As a part of personal context, some people may not care at all if their
location and movement are being tracked. On the other hand, some other people
may be extremely sensitive about their location and movement being tracked.
There are two important observations that motivate a multi-level security and
privacy framework for CenWits. First, individual sensitivity towards tracking
location and movement information varies based on the situation. Second, a lower
level of security and privacy support generally translates to faster propagation of
one’s location and movement information to the control center. This is because a
lower level of security generally incurs lower overhead. As a result, more witness
records may be exchanged between hikers during an encounter. This in turn
implies that the chances of locating a person in a short period of time improve if
a that person uses a lower level of security and privacy. Thus, a person is more
likely to accept a lower level of security and privacy, if he/she feels that there is
danger. Hence, context awareness plays a crucial role in building a security and
privacy framework that is acceptable to a large number of users.
5 Security Framework
It is clear that a single security model cannot address the needs of everyone under
all situations. A multi-level security framework is an appropriate framework for
a search and rescue system. The basic idea is that the system provides several
different levels of security and privacy support, and an individual chooses an
appropriate level based on his/her comfort level. Furthermore, because situations
may change over time, the system also provides appropriate support that allows
a user to switch from one security level to another based on the current situation.
Our preliminary design consists of five levels of security and privacy. Figure 1
illustrates these five levels along with effect of situational and personal contexts.
Each of these five levels are designed to protect the location and movement
information of an individual against a different type of adversary. Level 0 refers
to an absence of any security or privacy support. In this level, the identity and
movement information of a person is propagated without any attempt to hide
it or prevent it from tampering. A user will typically opt for this level when
he/she is in extreme danger. This level ofcourse has absolutely no impact on the
speed at which tracking and movement information is propagated to the control
center. Messages are exchanged in clear, and no sender or receiver authentication
is needed. Thus, there is no security overhead.
Level 1 security provides support for protecting individual information from
outsiders. At this level, hikers can exchange their location and movement infor-
mation with one another with the guarantee that this information is not leaked
out to an outsider. However, such a protection is not provided from the insiders,
i.e. an insider (another hiker) can track the identity, location and movement
of another hiker. Essentially, level 1 security has been designed to provide pro-
tection from a passive outsider adversary. A passive adversary is one who can
simply listen to the network communication without any capability to actively
insert packets, modify packets, or launch an attack against the network infras-
tructure. An implementation of this level requires sharing a single symmetric key
among all hikers, access points and control center. All information exchanged in
the system is encrypted using this key and an appropriate symmetric key proto-
col, e.g. AES. Level 1 requires encrypting each message before being sent. This
naturally incurs some performance overhead compared to level 0.
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Fig. 1. A Multi-Level Security & Privacy Framework.
Level 2 security provides protection from a passive adversary. Thus, in ad-
dition to passive outsider adversaries, level 2 security provides support for pro-
tecting individual information from passive insider adversaries as well. A passive
insider adversary is one who joins the system legitimately, and records all infor-
mation it can receive from the network. However, like a passive outsider adver-
sary, a passive insider adversary does not actively seek information from other
insiders, e.g. by injecting spurious packets, or modifying packets. An implemen-
tation of this level requires that each hiker share a separate symmetric with the
control center. This will ensure that a witness record generated by a hiker can
only be read by the control center. Additional mechanisms are needed to detect
duplicate witness records. This level incurs more security overhead than level
0, because in addition to encrypting each message, mechanisms are needed to
detect duplicate witness records and manage keys for each hiker.
In addition to passive adversaries, level 3 security provides support for pro-
tecting individual information from active adversaries. An active adversary is
one that actively seeks individual information by targeting individuals. Such
an adversary may insert spurious packets or replay packets to gain information.
This adversary may be an insider or an outsider. An implementation of this level
requires each hiker share a separate key with the control center. In addition, it
requires incorporating mechanisms to authenticate sender’s identity, determine
message integrity, and detect man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. As a result,
level 3 incurs more performance overhead than level 2.
Finally, level 4 security support protects the entire system from determined
adversaries, whose goal is to degrade or destroy the complete system, e.g. by
launching a denial of service attack. Such adversaries are extremely powerful and
may employ very expensive and sophisticated attack methods. Defending against
such adversaries is very difficult, and likely to significantly increase the cost of
the entire system. Furthermore, defending against such adversaries is likely to
significantly slow down the propagation of witness information to the control
center. At this time, we believe that the existence of determined adversaries is
extremely unlikely in a search and rescue system in a wilderness environment.
Hence, we are not planning to implement this level in CenWits at this moment.
6 Discussion and Current Status
Based on this multi-level security framework, a relatively carefree individual
can set his sensor to level 0 or 1 security, while a security-sensitive person can
set his sensor to level 2 or 3. It is very important that a user understands the
implications of setting his/her sensor to a particular level. This means that if a
user sets his/her sensor to level 3, the user understands that his/her location and
movement information will move relatively slowly to the control center, and that
means a search and rescue team will have relatively less accurate information
about his/her location in case of emergency. Similarly, if a user sets his/her sensor
to level 0, the user understands that his/her location and movement information
can be tracked by relatively less sophisticated individuals. However, a search
and rescue team will have a more accurate information about his/her location
in case of emergency.
A user can change his/her security level setting at any time. So, if a user
perceives that the current situation has turned dangerous at any time, e.g. if
a heavy rainfall starts, he/she may switch to a lower sensor security level to
ensure that his/her location and movement information is propagated faster. An
interesting question is if this switching of security levels can be automated. If the
system detects that the environment has become dangerous, e.g. there has been a
severe thunderstorm warning, or an avalanche has occurred, it may automatically
lower the security level chosen by a user. This capability is especially important
in emergency situations when a person may not be in a position to manually
switch his/her sensor security level. This will require equipping the sensor device
with appropriate sensing capabilities that can sense such dangerous situations.
At present, we are in the final stages of completing our design of this multi-level
security framework for CenWits based on these ideas.
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Abstract. Privacy is recognized as a fundamental issue for the provi-
sion of context-aware services. In this paper we present work in progress
regarding the definition of a comprehensive framework for supporting
context-aware services while protecting users’ privacy. Our proposal is
based on a combination of mechanisms for enforcing context-aware pri-
vacy policies and k -anonymity. Moreover, our proposed technique in-
volves the use of stereotypes for generalizing precise identity information
to the aim of protecting users’ privacy.
1 Introduction
The recent proliferation of powerful mobile devices, wireless networks, and sens-
ing technologies has enabled new classes of context-aware services, e.g., services
that adapt themselves to the current situation of the user. However, since adap-
tation involves the communication to the service provider of user’s private infor-
mation such as her location, activity, and profile data, in order to be accepted
by final users these services must be supported by mechanisms for preserving
privacy. In the literature about privacy in location-based services (LBS) it has
been shown that simply hiding users’ explicit identifiers (e.g., user’s name) may
not be sufficient to guarantee privacy, since the user’s identity can be possibly
inferred from the other information sent to the service provider. To this aim,
several approaches have been proposed for enforcing access control, or for guar-
anteeing anonymity. On the basis of the experience we have acquired in the last
years while working on a framework for context-awareness [1], and on privacy
in LBS [2], we argue that a satisfactory comprehensive solution for privacy in
context-awareness is still missing. As a matter of fact, we believe that a solu-
tion based solely on access control is unsuitable for many services, since simply
negating the access to a given context data (e.g., location) would determine the
impossibility of providing the service at all (e.g., a LBS). On the other hand,
work on anonymity for context-aware services has generally concentrated on
solely location, while the set of data that can be useful for adaptation is much
wider. In this paper we present work in progress regarding the definition of a
comprehensive framework for privacy protection in context-awareness.
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Fig. 1. Privacy threat and use-case scenario
External knowledge assumptions The privacy issue we are addressing, shown in
Figure 1(a), consists in preventing the attacker from inferring the sensitive asso-
ciation, i.e. the association between the user identity and the private information
(PI) of that user. According to the knowledge an attacker can acquire from ex-
ternal sources, data included in requests may increase his ability to reconstruct
the sensitive association (these data are called quasi-identifiers (QI) [3]).
Techniques for privacy preservation strongly depend on which knowledge an
hypothetical attacker can access. Therefore, in order to provide effective mecha-
nisms for protecting the user privacy, external knowledge assumptions must be
formalized with respect to the application logic of the required service and the
privacy threat to be contrasted.
2 Requirements and proposed solution
In order to illustrate how we intend to address privacy issues, we consider the
following running example:
Example 1. Consider a context-aware service providing points of interest (POIs)
to mobile users, depending on data such as location, profile, and interests. Sup-
pose that a hypothetical user Alina – a PhD student – is submitting a request
to that service using her GPS-enabled smart phone, in order to find a bookshop.
The service presented in the above example is representative of a large number of
mobile services, in which adaptation is performed considering not only location,
but a wide set of context data.
Since we claim that formal knowledge assumptions are fundamental for defin-
ing a privacy preservation technique, we couple the running example described
above with the following illustrative knowledge assumption:
- ΓC : the attacker can acquire knowledge about context data (including spatio-
temporal information and profile data), either directly from external sources,
or inferring them from other public data.
Assuming ΓC , each context data included in a requests can possibly act as QI.
According to this external knowledge assumption, in order to preserve Alina’s
privacy it is necessary to hide either her precise location, and her profile and in-
terests. Approaches based on access control techniques may determine the nega-
tion of that kind of data to the service provider. However, such a solution would
not be suitable to the above mentioned service – and, in general, to any context-
aware service– since spatio-temporal and context data are essential for selecting
a set of resources that can be potentially interesting to the user.
A better solution would consist in the application of obfuscation techniques;
i.e., in providing generalized data instead of their precise values. For instance
(see Figure 1(b)), instead of communicating the exact information regarding
Alina, it would be possible to provide the POI service with an area A1 including
her precise location (e.g., the block where she currently is), her status (i.e., a
PhD student), and her interests I. This solution would allow the service provider
to select a set of POIs that are actually close to Alina’s interests and location.
However, this approach does not prevent the attacker from identifying the issuer
of the request. In fact, Alina could be identified if the attacker has the knowledge
of Alina being the only PhD student in the area A1 having interests I.
Therefore, we have identified the following requirements for a privacy preser-
vation middleware addressed to users of context-aware services:
(a) A flexible mechanism for disclosing obfuscated context data, still guarantee-
ing a given level of privacy, is mandatory;
(b) Personal data acting as QI must be generalized in a meaningful way in order
to allow the service provider to adapt the service;
(c) When location is not the only context data to be provided, the obfuscation
process must determine the level of generalization of each context data in
order to fulfill either privacy and adaptation requirements.
In order to protect the sensitive association between the user’s identity and
her private information, obfuscation techniques can be applied either to QIs, to
PIs, or to both QIs and PIs. However, as a first effort towards the definition of
a comprehensive framework for privacy protection in context-awareness, in this
work we focus our investigation on the first approach.
2.1 k-Anonymity for users of context-aware services
In order to address requirement (a), we adopt the k-anonymity technique al-
ready introduced in database systems ([4]) and applied to LBS [5, 2]. The intu-
ition behind k-anonymity consists in making the user indistinguishable in a set
of k potential issuers. According to ΓC , any context data may act as QI; there-
fore, in order to enforce k-anonymity, any context data must be considered in
the generalization process.
Generalization depends on the semantics and representation of context data;
for instance, if the data is represented by one (or more) numerical values (e.g.,
GPS coordinates), the exact data is generalized to an interval (or to an area).
On the contrary, if the data is represented by a specific value v belonging to
a taxonomy T , it can be generalized to an ancestor of v in T . For example,
given a possible stereotype hierarchy, the exact stereotype of Alina (i.e., PhD
student) can be generalized to its parent student. Since the problem of optimal
multidimensional anonymization is NP-hard, we plan to adopt an approximation
algorithm for addressing multidimensional k-anonymity.
2.2 Identity generalization through stereotypes
In order to protect the user’s privacy, any data that uniquely identifies the user
must be removed from the user request. Hence, the most commonly adopted
solution consists in substituting the user-id (together with any possible user
personal data) with an anonymous pseudo-id, which can be used by the applica-
tion logic for performing tasks such as authentication and session management.
However, since in such a solution any reference to the user personal data are
lost, the service provider is no longer able to customize the service according to
data such as the user age, gender, and formal education, which are considered
very relevant for accurately personalizing services.
According to the requirement (b), we propose to extend the pseudo-id ap-
proach by the use of stereotypes [6] for generalizing the user’s identity. Stereo-
types are useful abstractions for characterizing users’ demographic data, person-
alities, and goals. Our solution allows the application logic not only to perform
authentication and session management, but also to customize the service ac-
cording to relevant (generalized) personal data, while preserving anonymity.
2.3 Context-aware privacy policies
The generalization of context data obviously impacts on the quality of adapta-
tion. Indeed, even if refinement techniques can be used for improving the service
response, it could happen that, in order to achieve the desired anonymity level,
context data become too general to provide the service at an acceptable quality
level [7]. In order to address this issue, we allow users to declare privacy policies
about the generalization of single context data, depending on the context itself:
Example 2. Alina declared the following privacy policies:
p1: If activity==working Then anonymity-level:=high
p2: If activity==shopping Then anonymity-level:=low
p3: If activity==walking Then provide-accurate-location
Alina asks the POI server for a bookshop. Since she is currently strolling for
shopping, policies p2 and p3 hold: then, her desired anonymity level is set to a
low value (corresponding to 4-anonymity), and the anonymizer provides a quite
accurate location (in order to select resources that are actually close to her).
Hence, in order to enforce Alina’s policies, the anonymizer generalizes Alina’s
exact stereotype to student for obtaining a smaller area A1 containing 4 potential
issuers (see Figure 1(b)), and communicates those data to the POI server.
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Moreover, for each context data the user can define the maximum granularity
of generalization on the basis of context (e.g., if I am walking, then generalize
location to at most 500m). Since it is not always possible to conciliate these
constraints with the desired level of anonymity, a conflict resolution mechanism is
adopted for choosing if either guaranteeing a lower anonymity level, generalizing
the context data to a higher granularity, or not providing the service at all.
2.4 Architecture overview
In order to illustrate how privacy preserving techniques can be integrated into
an architecture for context-awareness, in this section we consider an extension of
the CARE middleware [1]. CARE supports the acquisition of context data from
different sources, the reasoning with this data based on distributed policies,
and the reconciliation of possibly conflicting information. Figure 2 depicts an
extension of CARE to support privacy: the module devoted to apply our privacy
preservation techniques (called context-aware trusted server (cts)) acts
as an intermediary between the user trusted domain (left-hand side) and the
rest of the world (right-hand side). The user trusted domain is constituted by
the user profile manager (upm) – which manages user policies, and context
data explicitly provided by the user or acquired from user-side sensors – and by
the network operator profile manager (opm), which manages context
data such as users’ location and network status.
Numbers in Figure 2 represent the data flow upon a user request: each user
request (1) is filtered by the cts, which transforms the user ID into a pseudoID
– which is used to identify the user request and to perform authentication –
and removes any QI, before forwarding the request (2). Next (3), the service
provider asks for the context data it needs for adapting the service to a central
module called context provider, which forwards the request to the cts (4).
The cts retrieves user’s privacy policies, and distributed context data from the
user trusted domain, it merges context data solving possible conflicts, and gener-
alizes them according to the privacy policies (5). Then (6), it sends those data
– together with the (possibly generalized) user stereotype – to the context
provider, which merges them with context data retrieved from the service
provider profile manager (sppm) and external context sources (7), and
evaluates service provider policies, thus obtaining the aggregated context data
that are communicated to the application logic (8). Finally (9), the application
logic adapts the service and communicates the service response to the cts, which
forwards it to the user. Note that, in order to avoid eavesdropping, any commu-
nication between the cts, the service provider, and the context provider is
encrypted with public key cryptography.
3 Future work
This preliminary investigation has highlighted several important requirements
that will be the object of our future research efforts. In the following we mention
the most important aspects we are planning to consider: i) in order to allow users
to define their own privacy preferences depending on context, a sufficiently ex-
pressive language for context-aware privacy preferences is needed; ii) in order to
estimate the quality of service according to the chosen privacy policies, a mecha-
nism for measuring the trade-off between adaptation quality and anonymization
degree must be devised; iii) an efficient mechanism for multidimensional con-
text data generalization must be defined; iv) effective privacy techniques must
be applied to a dynamic case, i.e., when an attacker is able to reconstruct the
sensitive association by means of requests issued by the same user in different
time intervals.
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Abstract. In this paper we extend the concept of management domains to a new 
concept called Context-Aware Management Domains (CAMDs). CAMDs 
enable context-aware management of policies allowing the grouping of entities 
based on context information. Since context is dynamic, so is the domain 
membership. As a consequence, the association of policies with the entities in 
the domain also becomes dynamic. In this paper we provide CAMD examples 
and an information model together with a discussing on our ongoing 
implementation for our target context-aware service platform. 
1 Introduction 
Context aware services adapt themselves to the current user’s situation. An example 
of this is a tourist service which uses the current user location, activity, and 
preferences to personalize tourist advices. In order to support context awareness, 
service platforms have been designed to support context information acquisition, 
reasoning and distribution [1]. 
Typical context-aware service platforms have thousands or millions of entities 
(users, service providers, context providers, etc.) and different types of policies have 
to be managed. Policies are required, for instance, to control access to context 
information, to enforce user’s privacy, and to manage trust relationships among the 
entities. Due to the complexity, dynamicity, and large number of entities, the 
specification of these policies can easily become unmanageable. 
Standard policy management tools ease the policy management, however, the 
problem with these tools is that they provide either static management capabilities 
(e.g. management domains [2]), or, if there is some form of dynamic management, 
this is limited to one specific area (e.g., X-RBAC [3], [4], and [5] for access control 
and COMITY [6] for trust management). For this reason, these policy management 
tools do not fulfill the dynamic policy requirements of context-aware service 
platforms. 
In a context-aware service platform, policies are defined based on the context of 
the entities. One example is a privacy policy stating that “Bob’s identity should not be 
anonymized for nearby persons”. In this case, “nearby persons” refers to a set of 
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entities not known at policy specification time, because it is not possible to determine 
beforehand which entities are likely to approach Bob. 
In this paper we address context-aware policy management by extending 
management domains to a new concept called Context-Aware Management Domains 
(CAMDs). CAMDs are management abstractions that provide dynamic grouping of 
entities based on common context situations and, as a result, context-aware 
management of different types of policies. We provide an information model for 
CAMDs and discuss an implementation strategy for CAMDs in the scope of our 
target context-aware service platform [1]. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our context-aware service 
platform and describes the policy deployment scenario with examples. Section 3 
presents our new concept called Context-Aware Management Domains, the 
information model, and our ongoing implementation efforts. Section 4 compares our 
work with related work on context-aware management tools and Section 5 ends this 
paper with conclusions and future work. 
2 Policy Management in a Context-Aware Service Platform 
Figure 1 presents our target context-aware service platform considering a single 
administrative domain and illustrates the main roles we distinguish regarding the 
platform management and operation layers. 
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Fig. 1.  Policy deployment in a context-aware service platform 
Within the operation layer a user receives an authentication token (2), after 
authenticating with an identity provider (1), which is used to access a service provider 
(3). The service provider verifies the user’s identity (4) and retrieves context 
information to adapt the service (5 and 6). This information can be, for instance, the 
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current activity or location of the user; however, it can also include context 
information about other entities (context owners) that are relevant for the context-
aware service used (e.g. service provider). For details about the operation layer see 
[1]. 
Within the management layer an administrator accesses the policy provider in 
order to manage operation policies. Policies are rules that define a choice in the 
behavior of the system and can be of different types such as obligation, authorization, 
refraining, filtering, delegation, and meta-policies [7]. Policies of different types can 
also focus on different management areas, for example, access control, privacy 
enforcement and trust management. In this paper we support context-aware 
management of policies of different types and different areas, however, due to space 
limitations, we only exemplify obligation policies focusing on privacy enforcement. 
Obligation privacy policies describe actions that subjects must perform on target 
entities under certain conditions [7]. Such a policy could state, for instance, that “15 
minutes after getting Bob’s location, Alice (Bob’s colleague) should delete it” or 
“Bob’s identity should be anonymized by the identity provider when provided to 
Alice”. In the examples above the policy subjects and targets (Bob, Alice, and Bob’s 
identity provider) are individually specified in the policies and do not easily allow 
Bob to specify policies for a set of entities, for instance, all his colleagues. 
In order to allow the deployment of policies for a collection of entities, as opposed 
to individual entities, management domains [2] can be used as a grouping abstraction 
(e.g. Bob’s colleagues). Management domains reduce the management complexity in 
large systems because it is hard to specify and apply policies individually for each 
entity on a large scale. However, one problem with management domains is that they 
are static, and the inclusion and removal of entities from a domain must be done 
manually. In this paper we go one step further by defining management domains 
based on context situations [8] in a new concept called Context-Aware Management 
Domains (CAMDs). 
3 Context-Aware Management Domains 
In order to illustrate our new concept we present in Figure 2 an example where the 
Context-Aware Management Domain (CAMD) “colleagues currently at work” is 
mapped to every colleague in which the current activity status is “at work”. When 
persons change their activities domain membership also changes. As a result, any 
association of domain policies with entities also changes, as entities can leave/enter 
the domain dynamically according to changes in the context information. 
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Fig. 2.  Change in domain membership from context changes 
Through the definition of CAMDs it is possible to associate policies to dynamic sets 
of entities based on context situations. This has the potential to provide a more 
flexible management tool for association of policies with entities in a context-aware 
service platform. Figure 4 presents our information model for CAMDs which 
combines the policy management model from [2] and the context information model 
from [8]. 
Fig. 3.  Information Model for Context-Aware Management Domains (CAMDs) 
In [2], a Policy is a managed object triggered by events, which are related to other 
managed objects namely policy subjects and targets. Policy subjects and targets can 
be specified individually as individual managed objects or by means of management 
domains, which are static sets as has already been exemplified. In our model we 
define a CAMD as a specialized type of a management domain which is related to 
context situations and derives the entity set from the entities in the associated context 
situation.  
Context situations [7] are composite classes of entities and their context 
information. A situation has duration, which is defined by the moment the situation 
begins to hold (initial time), and the time the situation seizes to hold (final time). In 
this way, the membership of entities is dynamic as they join and leave the domain 
according to changes in the context situation. We are currently using the approach 
presented in [7] to define and realize context situations. 
An example of a context situation would be “persons nearby”, where “nearby” 
means persons within 20 meters from each other. When two persons are within 10 
46
 
 
meters from each other, they are said to be in the “persons nearby” situation. An 
example of CAMD characterized by the “persons nearby” context situation would be 
composed of all persons that are currently in situation “persons nearby” and a privacy 
obligation policy could be specified stating that “when Bob’s identity is requested by 
nearby persons it should not be anonymized”. 
Regarding the implementation of CAMDs we have analyzed the available context 
management mechanisms supported by our target context-aware service platform [1]. 
Our platform supports query-response, subscribe-notify, and event-condition-action 
(ECA) rules. These mechanisms have a direct impact on the performance of the 
CAMD implementation because it is necessary to query context from distributed 
context providers in the network to detect changes in the context situations. 
We choose to use ECA rules and we are currently implementing CAMDs using a 
distributed ECA rule engine called D-JESS [9]). D-JESS provides efficient rule 
execution considering detection of context situations based on a network of context 
providers. In this way we believe to achieve scalability and low response time in the 
deployment of policies using CAMDs. 
4 Related Work 
The work done by Damianou et al. [2] in the Ponder toolkit provides specification of 
policies and management domains. Entities are statically associated with domains 
which are then associated with different types of policies. Our work is inspired by 
their vision of policy-based management using domains however we include context 
situations as a dynamic component for domain membership management. 
Bathi et al. [3] have extended the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) standard to 
support the definition of parameterized access control roles. Their proposal is called 
X-RBAC and provides dynamic management of access control roles based on time 
and location constraints. Their focus is specific in access control policies for XML 
document sources at different levels (conceptual, schema, XML instance, and 
element). Compared to our work their work is more restricted to the type of policies 
(only access control) and type of context (only location and time). 
Corradi et al. [5] use context information to adapt trust relationships for pervasive 
environments in the so called COMITY security model. In their work they associate 
trust degrees with context conditions which are further associated with authorization 
and refrain policies allowing dynamic management. As was the case with [3], our 
concept of a context-aware domain can be seen as a generalization of [5] because our 
work allows context-aware management of different types of policies and does not 
focus on a specific management area such as access control or trust management. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper present a new concept called Context-Aware Management domains 
(CAMDs) in order to have a flexible and dynamic policy management model for 
context aware service platforms. In order to realize this new concept we present an 
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information model, based on previous work on context modeling and policy 
management, and our on going CAMD implementation efforts using a distributed rule 
engine called D-JESS. Our CAMD information model allows context-aware 
management of policies in a generic and flexible way and does not limit policies to an 
specific type or area (e.g. access control and trust). 
As future work we plan to finish our implementation using a distributed ECA rule 
engine and evaluate the scalability and performance regarding response time and 
network bandwidth consumption. We also want to analyze policy conflicts for 
CAMDs and study the deploying of CAMDs in a multi-administrative domains 
environment when the trustworthiness of the context information used for context 
situations detections is an issue. 
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